ABSTRACT. Methodological norms in economic theorising are interpreted as rational strategies to optimise some epistemic utility functions. A definition of 'empirical verisimilitude' is defended as a plausible interpretation of the epistemic preferences of researchers. Some salient differences between the scientific strategies of physics and of economics are derived from the comparison of the relative costs associated to each strategy. The classical discussion about the 'realism of assumptions' in economics is also considered under the light of the concept of 'empirical verisimilitude'.
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That is, we can assume that, ceteris paribus, a researcher will prefer that theory, model or set of data which has for him the highest possible epistemic value. Of course, different scientists may have different 'epistemic utility functions' (that is, a different epistemic element of their utility functions), but this does not preclude at all the possibility of explaining their different methodological preferences on the ground of their own epistemic values. It seems also plausible to see 'schools' within a single discipline, not only as groups defending similar theories, but mainly as sets of people sharing methodological and epistemic preferences different from the ones shared by other groups. On the other hand, since the researchers' utilities depend also on other kinds of things (prestige, income, credibility, power, practical uses of their discoveries), their individual choices can many times be inconsistent with the maximisation of epistemic values; but, if these values are seen as an essential goal of the collective enterprise of science, it seems reasonable to expect some kind of institutional enforcement of some methodological rules (for example, through formal education, review mechanisms, and so on). I will not pursue here an explanation of how this enforcement can be made effective, though I believe that this topic is one of the most exciting problems for the new economics of science.
The idea of an epistemic utility is not a new one in methodology of science; 2 it was proposed by Carl Hempel at the beginning of the 1960s, and developed by some followers of Rudolf Carnap's confirmationist approach and of the Bayesian explication of scientific reasoning; within these schools, the main epistemic utility associated to a scientific theory would be its truth, whose expected value is defined as the theory's degree of confirmation by the empirical evidence. From a different point of view, and following an idea of Karl Popper, several authors have also interpreted the idea of verisimilitude or closeness to the full truth as a plausible goal of scientific research, and 4 hence as a reasonable 'epistemic utility' for those who share a realist (rather than an instrumentalist or empiricist) interpretation of scientific knowledge. Some interesting work has been made both from the Bayesian approach and from the truthlikeness programme to show that some methodological norms usually followed (or, at least, preached) in scientific research can be derived from some definitions of those epistemic utilities; but nothing as ambitious as a 'complete' theory of the scientific method has been developed until now following these appealing lines.
I will examine in the following section some problems of the referred approaches, and will offer a different description of the epistemic goal of scientific research, a description somehow intermediate between empiricism and realism, and which, I think, captures better some essential elements of the epistemic preferences of real scientists. Of course, my aim in this paper is not to offer such a 'complete' account of the scientific method, nor of the method of economics, but simply to use my description of the epistemic utility function to illuminate a typical feature of economic theorising, namely, its habitual disdain for empirical testing (which I will try to explain in section III), as well as the classical discussion about the irrelevance of the 'realism of assumptions' (section IV).
II. SOME EPISTEMIC UTILITIES.
Confirmationist approaches.
Though the idea of epistemic utility has already been exploited in methodology, its 'returns' have not been still very high. In the first place, the notion of degree of confirmation and its derivatives (defended in the confirmationist and Bayesian 5 approaches 3 ) suffer from a radical flaw when the empirical evidence contradicts the theory which is being evaluated. If we assume that the epistemic utility of scientific researchers is p(T,E), where E is the empirical evidence and T is a theory or hypothesis, then all refuted theories will have the minimum epistemic value. This contradicts the common idea that a series of refuted theories can show some epistemic progress: for example, we can rationally believe that Newton's theory of gravitation is better than the Keplerian model of the solar system, which is better than Copernicus', which is better than Ptolemy's; all these four theories have been contradicted by further empirical research, and so their degree of confirmation is simply zero, though some epistemic progress seems to exist in their temporal sequence. The situation is not better with another common 'epistemic utility', confirmation excess: p(T,E) − p(T). In this case, the value of an empirically refuted theory will be simply p(T); so, for example, Newton's theory will have less value than its conjunction with any independent statement, even if this is also false or absurd. If we take seriously the idea that all interesting scientific theories are false, either because they include idealisations or simplifications, or because they will have sooner or later some empirical anomalies, then the confirmationist and Bayesian approaches offer a poor indication about the real epistemic value of these theories.
Verisimilitude.
For the verisimilitude programme things are a little better. Since the logical refutation of Popper's original definitions of verisimilitude at the beginning of the 1970s, a large number of alternative definitions have been proposed. Two of the most appealing ones are those of Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers. The first has made a reasonable distinction between the actual closeness to the truth of a theory and the 6 estimated value of this closeness under some empirical evidence. 4 The former is an inverse function of the 'distances in the logical space' between the possible states of the world allowed by the theory and the actual state of the world; the latter is simply the statistical expectation to the first function. Though Niiniluoto's concepts allow to say that a refuted theory has a very high level of truthlikeness or expected truthlikeness, or is more verisimilar than another refuted theory, it suffers from two important problems:
in the first place, according to his definitions, the verisimilitude of a theory will be essentially dependent on the language in which it is expressed; that is, if t(A) and t(B)
are the translations of A and B to a different language, it can be the case that A has more verisimilitude -either actual or expected-than B, while t(B) is more truthlike than t(A).
In the second place, his definition of estimated verisimilitude has not allowed thus far to derive interesting methodological rules, and so, it is of little use either to understand the actual development of science, or to give us indications about how to make theory choices which are efficient in the pursuit of truth.
Theo Kuipers has offered some semantic definitions of verisimilitude.
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According to the simplest one, a theory A is closer to the truth than another theory B if and only if all theoretically possible systems ('models' in the terminology of formal semantics, not in the economic sense) which make B true also make A true, and all theoretically possible systems incompatible with A are also incompatible with B (and there is some theoretically possible system compatible with A which is not compatible with B, or some impossible system compatible with B and not compatible with A).
Kuipers' idea is especially interesting because he replaces the notion of 'factual truth'
for that of 'theoretical truth': the aim of scientific theories would not be to discover individual 'facts', but laws or regularities about the world. 6 From this definition it is possible to prove that, if all known empirical laws derivable from B are also derivable 7 from A and there is some law derivable from A which refutes B, then it is still possible that A is closer to the truth than B, but it is not possible that B is closer to the truth than A (stated in more Popperian terms: the meta-hypothesis 'A is closer to the truth than B'
has been 'corroborated', in the sense that it has resisted the attempts to falsify it; the proof is based on the assumption that the set of all theoretically possible models is a subset of every confirmed empirical law, that is, on the assumption that these empirical laws are true). Hence, the hypothetico-deductive method would be consistent with the aim of getting theories which were closer and closer to the truth. Unfortunately, it is also possible to prove that, in many interesting cases, comparisons of verisimilitude can not be made according to Kuipers' definition. For example, if A and B are mutually incompatible theories, and both have been empirically refuted (in the sense that all their models fail to obey at least one known empirical law), then the set of systems which make A true, the set of those which make B true, and the 'theoretical truth', will be pairwise disjoint, and neither A nor B can be closer to the truth than the other, whatever the relative number of successes of those theories. The same occurs if A entails a law which is not entailed by B, and B entails a law which is not entailed by A.
3. Empirical verisimilitude.
As we have seen, neither the confirmationist approach nor the verisimilitude programme seem to have supplied some 'epistemic utility' which is able to illuminate the actual course of science, or, at least, which is appropriate to be used as a normative criterion of epistemic rationality. I have proposed elsewhere to explore a different possibility, one in some way intermediate between realism and empiricism, and which I propose to call 'empirical verisimilitude'; 7 according to this concept, the epistemic 8 value of a theory depends essentially on two factors: a) the similarity between the image of the world offered by the theory and the image of the world which derives from the known empirical regularities, and b) the amount of information about the world that those regularities provide (which can be recursively defined as the empirical verisimilitude of the propositions stating those regularities, assessed through a still 'more empirical' set of statements). This is a 'compromise' between empiricism and realism because, in the first place, the value of a theory is assessed basically through our empirical knowledge. But, on the other hand, a theory does not lose automatically its value if it is falsified, since a false theory can offer a description of the empirical facts more or less close to the true description of these facts. Moreover, this 'empirical knowledge' is simply constituted by the most verisimilar hypothesis about what in a certain process of research is taken as given, and this can refer to macroscopic, common-sense objects, or to highly 'theoretical' entities.
A possible formalisation of this idea is the following: let T be a theory or hypothesis, and let E be a collection of empirical regularities about those aspects of the world that T tries to explain (I will refer with E sometimes to a set of statements, and other times to the conjunction of those statements); let B represent the 'background knowledge' or 'basic presuppositions' of a scientist or a scientific community, including metaphysical, heuristic or ontological principles, aesthetic preferences, moral or ideological principles, and so on; let p be a probability function, and, finally, let X u represent the assertion that X is true under the margin of approximation u. Hence, we can define:
From these definitions it is possible to derive a set of methodological norms (in the sense explicated in section I) which are reasonable representations of some very common methodological attitudes. For example, with function Vs 1 , the empirical verisimilitude of a theory increases if it is corroborated by a new empirical finding, if both its degree of confirmation and its likelihood increase, if a new fact is found such that it is more probable under T&E than under E alone, etc. Regarding the comparison of two theories, if both are confirmed by the empirical evidence, then the most informative (the less probable) will be the most verisimilar, but if both entail E, then the most probable will be the most verisimilar; when one of them is better confirmed than the other and is also less probable, then it will be more verisimilar; and if one of them has more likelihood and is more probable than the other, then it will also be more verisimilar. Another interesting consequence from the definition of Vs 1 is that the maximum empirical verisimilitude that T can receive (or E can give) is Inf(T) (resp.,
Inf(E)), which forces to look for still less probable theories ('bold' ones, in Popper's terms) and for new informative empirical findings. Finally, the expected value of
Vs 1 (T,E) is p(T&E,B)/p(T,B)p(E,B) = p(T,E&B)/p(T,B) = p(E,T&B)/p(E,B), a typical
Bayesian measure, which can be taken into account by scientists especially in those circumstances when new and unknown empirical results are expected. Unfortunately,
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Vs 1 has the same problem which invalidated the degree of confirmation as a measure of epistemic utility: it has the zero value for every refuted theory.
The other functions do not suffer from this problem. Vs 2 , Vs 3 and Vs 4 exploit the idea that the similarity between E and T depends basically on the similarity between the different states of the world consistent with each proposition, and on the relation between T and each empirical regularity which characterises E. From Vs 3 , besides some of the results commented above (sometimes more or less reformulated), it is also possible to derive the following fundamental theorem: (2) Suppose that all the empirical facts in E are statistically independent of each other, and that the only possible connections between each one and T are the following:
either it is entailed by T, or its negation is entailed by T, or it is statistically independent of T (and the same for S). Under this assumption, if T entails all the empirical facts in E entailed by S, S is refuted by all the empirical facts that refute T, and p(S,B) ≤ p(T,B), then Vs 3 (S,E) ≤ Vs 3 (T,E).
The proof is based on a lemma which asserts that, given the idealising assumptions expressed in the first part of the theorem, then the value of Vs 3 
(T,E) is p(T,B)/p(C(E,T),B)p((C(E,T)&I(E,T))vT,B), where C(E,T) and I(E,T) represent,
respectively, those regularities in E which are explained by T and those which are statistically independent of T.
Assuming that p(T,B) is 'small' with respect to both p(C(E,T),B) and p(I(E,T),B) (that is, if universal theories are always much less probable a priori than any conjunction of empirical regularities), then Vs 3 (T,E) and Vs 4 (T,E) can be approximated respectively by:
We can interpret the denominator of these expressions as indicating that, though it is good for a theory both to explain the empirical facts and not to be falsified by them, the former is still better than the latter.
Theorem (2) allows to understand a common methodological attitude among scientists, one that is difficult to explain from other formal reconstructions of the scientific method. It is the fact that a higher empirical success is not a sufficient condition for preferring one theory to another; that is, a theory may have proved its superiority in terms of the amount of facts explained by it and of its resistance to falsification, but many scientists may still prefer an 'empirically inferior' theory, even recognising its 'inferiority', provided that the empirically more successful theory has a very low prior probability in comparison with the less successful one. Since 'revolutionary' theories usually contain hypotheses which are contrary to the background presuppositions of the 'old' scientific community, they can be rejected by many researchers even if these theories explain successfully many of the 'anomalies of the old paradigm' (to use Thomas Kuhn's classic terms (2), Vs 5 (T,E) = 1/p(C(T,E),B). Hence, if a theory explains at least all the facts explained by another (i. e., if C(T,E) includes C(S,E)), then the former will seem at least as close to the truth as the latter, independently of the cases where they are falsified, and independently of their prior probability. This seems to be consistent with Lakatos' indication that, during the first stages of a scientific research programme (when the number of new empirical findings is growing at a high rate), falsifications are not taken into account, only confirmations.
III. IS ECONOMIC THEORY TOO THEORETICAL?
The general methodological norms derivable from measures Vs 3 and Vs 5 are, from my point of view, close enough to the common ideas about the nature of scientific method as to allow us to take them as more or less acceptable (though strongly simplified and idealised) descriptions of the epistemic element in the scientists' utility functions. This does not imply that all scientists have the same epistemic utility function, since the values of our Vs's will depend on each researcher's subjective probabilities and background presuppositions. But, if my hypothesis is true, scientists will look for theories which 1) are 'highly plausible' according to their background presuppositions, 2) have many and important empirical successes, and 3) have few empirical failures. Note especially that the second requirement usually goes against the 13 first one: in order to explain many and strong empirical laws, a theory must be logically strong, and hence, it will have a low prior probability. This fact is not a contradiction, but an essential trade-off in scientific theorising. It simply means that finding out a highly verisimilar theory is not an easy task, since one need look for simple, realistic and elegant principles with one eye, and for strong empirical predictions with the other.
The idea I am going to defend in this section is that we can employ these utility functions to show that methodological differences among scientific disciplines can exist because the relative costs of each methodological decision are different in each discipline.
Scientific researchers are human subjects who must choose one single option in every situation they confront; they must choose what lines of research to pursue, what problems to tackle, which known techniques to apply, which new ones to learn, what empirical observations or experiments to make, and so on. Obviously, each individual researcher will tend to take that decision which gives to him a higher level of 'utility', though it is reasonable to expect that, from the 'institutional' point of view, the best decision, and so, the one which will tend to be socially sanctioned, will be that which produces a higher 'epistemic value' (if this is not so, we can think of a 'failure' of the corresponding institution). In any case, all those decisions will have different expected 'returns' (both for the individual and for his scientific community) depending on the peculiarities of the objects under study in each discipline, on the theoretical, observational and experimental techniques available, and also on the different background presuppositions of each scientific community. This means that, even if two disciplines share the same epistemic utility function, each one will tend to use a different combination of methods as long as they confront different relative costs.
14 For the sake of simplicity, imagine that a scientist has only two possible 'instruments' to choose between them: theoretical refinements and empirical testing, to which some amount of effort can be devoted in continuous quantities TR and ET. Some differences between two disciplines (say, economics and physics) can be explained because of the different rates of return associated to each combination of these instruments. I will refer here to theoretical economics and theoretical physics, that is, to the work of those researchers whose explicit aim is to find out a 'theory' about a certain aspect of the world; 8 I will also assume that these researchers try to find out a theory which has the highest possible value of Vs 3 or Vs 4 . The horizontal axis of fig. 1 indicates the amount of effort devoted to the empirical testing of the devised theories, that is, to the attempt to derive testable empirical consequences from them and to indicate the empirical data which could be used to test them; if these attempts are successful, they will make it to increase the denominator of the expression of Vs 3 (as approximated in (3)). The vertical axis represents the amount of effort devoted to theoretical refinements, that is, to attempts to make the theory more plausible, i. e., more consistent with the discipline's background presuppositions; this will make it to increase the value of the numerator of Vs 3 . For each combination of ET and TR there will be a certain expected level of verisimilitude associated to it. It is reasonable to assume that the curves of constant expected verisimilitude must be decreasing (since a lesser amount of effort devoted to one instrument has to be compensated with a higher effort devoted to the other one) and convex (indicating decreasing marginal returns of each instrument: equal increments in the use of one instrument allow to substitute decreasing amounts of the effort devoted to the other one). Fig. 1 also shows that, at any point of the ET-TR space, the iso-expected verisimilitude curve of physics passing through that point will have a steeper slope than the curve corresponding to economics; 15 this is due to the fact that an equivalent decrease of effort devoted to theoretical refinement will be easier to compensate in physics with some additional effort devoted to testing than in economics (that is, in general it is less costly to devise strong and successful empirical tests in the former than in the latter, while we can suppose that successful theoretical refinements have more or less the same cost in each discipline; of course, the expected level of verisimilitude associated to one point of the ET-TR space needs not be the same in both disciplines: it is reasonable to suppose that it is higher in physics than in economics).
9 Figure 1 Assuming that the same total amount of effort can be expended by a physicist and an economist, both will have the same 'budget constraint' (a straight line with slope equal to -1), and their optimal choices will be those represented in fig. 2 , where ET e , TR e , ET p and TR p are respectively the amounts of effort in each scientific instrument chosen by economists and by physicists. The obvious conclusion is that the theoretical economist will devote more effort to theoretical refinements than the theoretical physicist, and less effort to empirical testing. It is important to note that the same utility function is assumed both to represent the epistemic preferences of physicists and those of economists; so, this methodological difference is due, according to the argument, only to the difference in the relative costs of empirical testing in both disciplines. So, coming back to the question with which this section begun ('is economic theory too theoretical?'), from the fact that economic theory is more theoretical and less empirical than theoretical physics, it does not follow necessarily that it is also too theoretical and too little influenced by empirical testing. It would not make it necessarily 'better' with some different combination of theory and testing, since this choice would lead to a lesser expected verisimilitude than that reached through the optimal choice in fig. 2 . Given the nature of economic facts, transferring to empirical testing some part of the effort devoted to theoretical refinements would not warrant that economic theories become better from the epistemic point of view. fig. 1 , it will be more efficient for the maximisation of Vs 3 or Vs 4 to follow some 'mixed' strategy, even some one more skewed towards the left corner. This means that, besides some reasonable degree of empirical success, economic theories will normally tend to be defended on the ground of their consistency and similarity with the background presuppositions of the discipline (or of each economic school), and this is a highly theoretical work.
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The numerators of Vs 3 and Vs 4 in (3) were, respectively, p(T,B) and p(T u ,B).
Maximising these quantities can be reasonably interpreted as maximising the degree of realisticness of the theory, not in the (Popperian) sense of its 'closeness to the full -and unknown-truth', but in the less obscure sense of its coherence with our basic beliefs about the working of the economic system and about the desirable formal structure of economic models (recall that B comprises not only ontological but also ideological and heuristic assumptions). The second expression (p(T u ,B)) takes also into account that, 18 though theory T may be surely false according to our background presuppositions (because it contains simplifications, idealisations, or other counterfactual assumptions)
it can nevertheless offer a description of reality similar to what one basically assumes about the world, and the prior probability of T u can be high even if the margin of approximation u is more or less small. So, even a very formalised and stylised economic model can still be very 'plausible' for many economists if its assumptions are consistent with three basic ideas: the identification of individual rationality with expected utility maximisation, the assumption that a stable equilibrium obtains, and the idea that certain mathematical concepts and techniques offer a description of the economic situation not very far from the way things essentially are. The elements of reality which are more contradictory with the idealised structure of the model are usually considered 'less relevant', in such a way that their suppression in the model is not seen as a big departure from reality. For example, the assumptions of price-taker agents and one-price in competitive markets, of rational expectations in new classical macroeconomics, or of more or less ad hoc utility functions in the economics of information, all of these are seen as unacceptably strong idealisations by many heterodox economists, but simply as approximately true descriptions of the world by many mainstream scholars. This means that the underlying definition of the margins of approximation u will be basically school-dependent, and we can take it as an essential element of the 'basic presuppositions' of each school (that is, as an element of B).
13
It is interesting to note that one of Friedman's main arguments to defend the acceptability of the maximisation hypothesis is that the market will eliminate, through a process of 'natural selection', those entrepreneurs who do not choose that strategy which leads them to make maximum profits; so, we can expect that the market will be populated mainly by profit-maximising firms, even if their managers do not consciously 19 intend to make optimum profits. But no empirical proof of this argument is offered in Friedman's essay. So, the value of this argument depends solely on its consistency with our basic knowledge of the functioning of the market. Stated in our formal framework, Friedman's aim is to show that, even if our background ideas (B) are in contradiction with the hypothesis 'entrepreneurs try to make maximum profits' (H), the probability of the proposition 'entrepreneurs act as if they tried to maximise profits' (H u ) given B is, instead, very high.
The consistency between the empirical consequences of a theory and our observations of reality are, of course, another important element to assess the epistemic value of that theory. In fact, it can also be argued that a theory is said to be 'realistic' if, among other things, it makes correct predictions 14 . For, if two theories have the same degree of prior probability, but one of them makes much better predictions than the other, then the former will obviously offer a description of the known facts 'closer to the truth' than the latter. The expression of Vs 4 also takes into account that, in order to reach a high epistemic value, it is not strictly necessary to have a full coincidence between the theory's predictions and the empirical observations: the theory can simply make predictions which are close enough to the observed facts (v being the acceptable margin of approximation). But, in any case, if the effort directed towards the discovery of successful predictions is less productive in economics in terms of verisimilitude than the elaboration of elegant models and mathematical proofs, it is reasonable to expect that theoretical economists will devote less effort to that kind of activity than other scientists.
The fact that increasing p(T,B) or p(T u ,B) is a good strategy for the maximisation of the verisimilitude of T, has contributed to create the impression that economic theory is a deductive science (rather than an 'inductive' or 'hypothetico-20 deductive' one). This is due to the fact that the best way of increasing the prior probability of T is simply to show that it derives from B (since, in this case, p(T, system plus what our experience has shown a posteriori as strong regularities about that system (and, the stronger they are, the more 'essential'); obviously, a theory can only have a high value of Vs 3 or Vs 4 by being highly compatible with those presuppositions and by entailing many known regularities as strong as possible (remember that this last requisite tends to favour theories which are 'deeper', and hence, less probable a priori).
Finally, note also that, as in the case of Kuipers' definition of verisimilitude, my own definitions do not refer to the closeness of a theory to the actual state of the world, but 22 to its closeness to a set of lawlike propositions (some of them discovered by means of reflection and some others empirically).
In the second place, and regarding the work of Deirdre McCloskey, 18 the approach followed in this paper allows to give a definite sense to the expression 'rhetoric', and hence, to see 'persuasion' as a rational strategy in the maximisation of verisimilitude. I propose to include under the term 'rhetoric' all those arguments directed towards the modification of prior probabilities; since the probability functions employed in this paper have been assumed to be subjective, they can be changed through the use of many kinds of strategies. For example, if you did not know that T can be derived from B, but accept a proof of such a derivation later, your subjective value of p(T,B) will pass from some number lesser than one to one; this proof can be a formal one (like the transformation of the 'invisible hand' hypothesis into the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics), or an informal one (like Alchian's and Friedman's 'proof' that the market will tend to select the profit maximasing firms). In other cases, a mere change of wording can serve sometimes to shift downwards or upwards someone's subjective prior probabilities; think, for example, of the refrasing of 'natural rate of unemployment' into 'non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment', or of 'profit' into 'surplus'. As long as all these strategies can make it higher or lower the value of p(T,B), they can be used to affect the verisimilitude that each researcher assigns to theory T. In this sense, rhetoric should not be seen as a strategy opposite to that of increasing the realisticness of economic models, but rather as a very useful way to do just this, as Mäki has recently suggested. 19 Lastly, my criticism to instrumentalist methodology in economics has also some interesting connections with Hausman's diagnosis of the economic method. According to Hausman, mainstream economic theory has been governed since the times of the 23 classics by the strategies of 'inexactness', which he accepts, and 'separateness', which he criticises. 20 As I understand these strategies (which I will not try to interpret in depth here), the former amounts to the recognition that economic reality is too complicated to be described in detail by tractable economic theories; so, these theories will necessarily offer inexact (and sometimes very inexact) descriptions of the facts. The strategy of separateness amounts to the refusal to explore alternative causal hypotheses, different from the 'individualist-rationality-with-equilibrium' assumption of most economic models. Hausman suggests 21 that, though inexactness can not be totally avoided, some of its negative consequences could by alleviated through the use of richer empirical methods; from the point of view of the model I have developed in section III, the use of new empirical methods would make the iso-expected verisimilitude curves of economics more sloped, moving towards the right the optimal choice in fig. 2 , and, on the other hand, it would increase the height of each curve, and accordingly the maximum expected verisimilitude reachable with a given amount of effort. With respect to separateness, Hausman's recommendation is to explore new theoretical possibilities; this would be equivalent to putting under scrutiny the background presuppositions of economic schools, especially of mainstream economics. In any case, both of Hausman suggestions would be something like an 'external shock' in the model of section III, and so, it is difficult to see how the economics profession could undertake 'endogenously' such a revolutionary change in its tools and its basic presuppositions.
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V. CONCLUSION.
In spite of its increasing mathematical sophistication, economic theory is a branch of science much different from physics; the main source of this difference is not the impossibility of building up economic models in an axiomatic fashion, nor the supposed fact that the epistemic aims of economics are not the same as those of physics.
I have assumed in this paper that all science has the same fundamental epistemic aim: maximisation of empirical verisimilitude, which basically depends on the prior plausibility of each theory and of its degree of empirical success. From this asumption I have shown that methodological differences between scientific disciplines can be explained by the different 'rates of return' that each methodological strategy may have in each discipline. In particular, it is rational to expect that economic theory is less empirical than those branches of natural science where succesful strong predictions are easier to make. This means that increasing the plausibility of the economic models' assumptions (i. e., increasing their 'realisticness') will usually be a reasonable strategy for the maximisation of the verisimilitude of economic theories. Rhetoric, for example, can be taken as an instrument, among others, to carry out this strategy, and not as something running against the pursuit of 'realisticness'. NOTES * Research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Government's DGICYT, as part of research project PB 95-0125-C06 ('Science and Values'). I want to thank prof.
important role within economic theorising (and within scientific theorising in general), which is related to the fact that the verisimilitude of a theory depends essentially upon the basic presuppositions ('B') of each 'school'. This role would be to help us in the discussion about which presuppositions are more reasonable. For example, we could discuss whether the acceptability of an economic model should depend more on the realisticness of its assumptions than on its mathematical elegance, whether the existence of a general equilibrium should be taken for granted in macroeconomic models or not, whether politicians should be described as mere 'rent maximisers' in order to understand the influence of the government into the economy, and so on. I think that, in general, the arguments supporting one position or another in those discussions have to be 'rhetoric', in the sense that they are lastly grounded neither on logical proofs nor on empirical data. 20 See Hausman (1992) , pp. 90 ff.
21 Hausman (1992), pp. 253-4. 
